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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE,
v.
THOMAS WESTLAND CALLAHAN,

Case No. 20050753-CA

DEFENDANT/APPELLEE.
Not Incarcerated
JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this
misdemeanor appeal from a court of record.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Does prosecutorial misconduct require a new trial?
This Court reviews claims of prosecutorial misconduct under an abuse of
discretion standard, and will reverse of the prosecutor's conduct or remarks called the
jury's attention to improper matters in circumstances indicating a reasonable likelihood of
a more favorable result absent the misconduct. See, State v. Kohl 2000 UT 35, TJ 22, 999
P.2d 7.
This issue was preserved by trial counsel's objections (R. 124 at 96, 108).
2. Was the evidence legally insufficient to sustain the trespass conviction?
To challenge the jury's trespass conviction, Mr. Callahan must marshal all

evidence sustaining that verdict, and state the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, and then demonstrate why, as a matter of law, the evidence was legally
insufficient. See, e ^ , State v. Pritchett 2003 UT 24, ^ 22, 69 P.3d 1278.
This issue was not preserved by trial counsel. Callahan relies on the doctrines of
ineffective assistance, plain error and exceptional circumstances in seeking full relief on
appeal.
CONTROLLING STATUTES
Pertinent constitutional provisions and statutes are in the addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
The State charged Mr. Callahan with three counts of class A misdemeanor assault
on a peace officer and one count of class C misdemeanor trespass (R. 1-3).
A jury convicted Callahan of two counts of assault on a peace officer (for assaults
on Officers Wihongi and Peterson) and one count of trespass (for remaining on property
with a reckless state of mind regarding whether his presence would cause fear for the
safety of another), and acquitted him of the remaining count of assault on a peace officer
(for Officer Findlay) (R. 1-3, 70).
Judge Reese sentenced Callahan to two years in jail, suspended 277 days, gave
Callahan credit for time served, and put Callahan on one year of good behavior probation
to the court (R. 105-07; R. 125 at 6).
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Appointed counsel filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 110).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 26, 2002, at about 5:20 p.m., Mr. Callahan, age 60, was sitting on a
bench in front of the Liberty Senior Citizens Center peacefully opening cans of food with
the can opener on his Leatherman tool (R. 124 at 66, 51-52, 61). He was homeless and
had eaten meals at the center in the months prior to this, and had been warned on
occasions that his boisterous behavior was inappropriate and would not be tolerated (R.
124 at 21-22), but there is no evidence that there was anyone around him when he was
sitting there trying to eat on August 26, 2002, some two hours after closing time (R. 124
at 20).
Police officers Peterson and Wihongi responded to the scene to investigate a
trespass complaint at the center (R. 124 at 48-51, 68).
Callahan was peaceful and was not threatening anyone with his Leatherman, but
Peterson walked up to Callahan and forcefully took the Leatherman out of Callahan's
hand and put it down out of Callahan's reach (R. 124 at 52, 62). Peterson could not recall
if he and Wihongi identified themselves as police, and Callahan was angry and wanted to
know why they were bothering him (R. 124 at 52-53).
The officers, who were in uniform, told Callahan they were there to investigate his
presence there, and he calmed down (R. 124 at 51-53, 61).
While Officer Peterson was on the phone trying 1o get information from the
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complainant, Peterson noticed that Officer Wihongi had drawn his baton, and that
Callahan was standing in a fighting stance (R. 124 at 53-54, 63). Peterson pulled his
baton, but before Peterson could hit Callahan on the leg as he intended, Wihongi pushed
Callahan to the ground (R. 124 at 54, 63). The officers subdued Callahan, who was
cursing and agitated, and cuffed him behind his back (R. 124 at 54, 56, 63-65, 67).
Peterson, the only witness who testified about these events, testified that Callahan
threatened Wihongi with the Leatherman (R. 124 at 68). He then explained that Wihongi
told Peterson that Callahan had grabbed the Leatherman and had refused to put it down,
telling Wihongi that Wihongi would have to shoot him to get him to drop it (R. 124 at
71). Peterson's report said that Callahan grabbed the Leatherman, and does not detail any
conversation or any threat towards Wihongi by Callahan with the Leatherman (R. 124 at
70).
Peterson alleged that the officers had Callahan cuffed in back and were taking him
by his arms to their car, when Callahan turned toward Peterson, who lost balance and fell
to the ground with Callahan on top of him (R. 124 at 56, 64-65, 67). Callahan's glasses
were broken and his nose was cut (R. 124 at 57, 65). Peterson pushed Callahan off, and
as the officers subdued Callahan and shackled his legs, Callahan was spitting and trying
to kick Peterson and trying to bite Wihongi on the leg (R. 124 at 56-57). Peterson
testified that Callahan also kicked at a third officer Finlay, and also fought with jail
officers when they brought him to the jail (R. 124 at 59-60).
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An employee from the center gave Callahan a letter on August 28, 2002, telling
him he was unwelcome at the center, and also told him this personally on that date, but
could not recall that she ever told him this before that date (R. 124 at 24-25, 29, 37, 42,
46).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The prosecutor's discussion of facts not in evidence in closing argument requires a
new trial. Contrary to his arguments (R. 124 at 96), there was no evidence that Callahan
pointed the Leatherman at the officers and threatened Wihongi with it. Contrary to his
arguments (R. 124 at 108), there is no evidence that an officer approached Callahan and
asked to speak to him, and Callahan spit at him, kicked him and waived a can opener in
his face (R. 124 at 108).
The evidence was legally insufficient to sustain the trespass charge, which was
charged and defined by jury instructions as Callahan's remaining on property with a
reckless state of mind regarding whether his presence would cause fear for the safety of
another. There was no evidence to support this theory on the facts of this case, which
prove that Callahan was sitting on a bench outside the center peacefully opening his
canned food when the police approached him.
While trial counsel did not seek a directed verdict or preserve the issue, given the
total lack of evidence to sustain this charge, this Court should reverse that conviction and
order that charge dismissed.
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ARGUMENTS
I.
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.
A. RELEVANT LAW
Utah law has long recognized that a criminal trial is supposed to be a search for the
truth, rather than a mere contest between the defense and prosecution.1 In State v.
Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951, the court explained the special role of the
prosecutor, which does not call for overreaching, but which requires constant vigilance
for fairness. The court stated,
Once again we observe that prosecutors have duties that rise above those of
f,
privately employed attorneys
[P]rosecutors have a duty to eschew all
improper tactics." ...
"[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one."
Id. at 961 (citations omitted).
If a prosecutor's comments taint the fundamental fairness of the proceedings, the

'See, e.g.. State v. Hav. 859 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993); State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656,
662 (Utah 1985); State v. JarrelL 608 P.2d 218, 224 (Utah 1980).
6

arguments violate a defendant's right to due process of law. See, e.g., Darden v.
Wainwright 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986).2 Claims of prosecutorial misconduct require a
fact-specific inquiry which is guided by the defendant's constitutional rights to a fair
trial.3
In Utah, the general test for prosecutorial misconduct is set forth in State v. Troy,
688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984), as follows:
"The test of whether the remarks made by counsel are so
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case is, did the remarks call
to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not be justified in
considering in determining their verdict, and were they, under the
circumstances of the particular case, probably influenced by those remarks."
Id. at 486 (citation omitted). Arguing matters unsupported by evidence violates Troy. Id.
The Troy Court persuasively explained the prejudice analysis further,
Step two is more difficult and involves a consideration of the
2

Article I §§ 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution provide due process of law and the
right to a fair trial, as does Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6. Article I § 7, the due process
provision, has been interpreted as requiring exclusion of unreliable evidence which is
likely to be unduly impressive to jurors, see State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991),
and as requiring an inquiry into the merits of the case to be adjudicated, see
generally Christiansen v. Harris. 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). Article I § 12 provides
the general procedural and substantive rights of criminal defendants to insure the
fundamental fairness of criminal proceedings. See, generally. State v. Anderson, 612
P.2d 778 (Utah 1980). When a prosecutor's arguments draw the jurors' attention away
from the merits of the case, and call into question the reliability and fairness of the
proceedings and verdict or sentence, these provisions are implicated
3

See United States v. Soconv-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 240 (1940)("Of
course, appeals to passion and prejudice may so poison the minds of the jurors even in a
strong case that an accused may be deprived of a fair trial.... [E]ach case necessarily turns
on its own facts.").
7

circumstances of the case as a whole. In making such a consideration, it is
appropriate to look at the evidence of defendant's guilt.
"If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct or
remark will not be presumed prejudicial." Likewise, in a case with less
compelling proof, this Court will more closely scrutinize the conduct. If the
conclusion of the jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or
evidence susceptible of differing interpretations, there is a greater
likelihood that they will be improperly influenced through remarks of
counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may be searching for guidance in
weighing and interpreting the evidence. They may be especially susceptible
to influence, and a small degree of influence may be sufficient to affect the
verdict. Counsel is obligated in such cases to avoid, as far as possible, any
reference to those matters the jury is not justified in considering.
Id. at 486-87 (citation omitted).
It is the State's burden to show that prosecutorial misconduct was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt. State v. Tarafa. 720 P.2d 1368, 1373 and n.21 (Utah 1986). All
reasonable doubts are to be resolved in favor of the defendant. State v. Eaton. 569 P.2d
1114, 1116 (Utah 1977).4
B. APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS
The prosecutor's discussion of facts not in evidence in closing argument requires a
new trial.
Contrary to his arguments (R. 124 at 96), there was no evidence that Callahan
pointed the Leatherman at the officers and threatened Wihongi with it.
Contrary to his arguments (R. 124 at 108), there is no evidence that an officer

4

More recent opinions from the Utah Supreme Court have stated differing
standards. See, e^g., State v. Hav, 859 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993)(a defendant must show that
the results would likely have been more favorable in the absence of the misconduct).
8

approached Callahan and asked to speak to him, and Callahan spit at him, kicked him and
waived a can opener in his face (R. 124 at 108).
When trial counsel objected to the prosecutor's misstatements of the evidence, the
trial court did nothing to reign in the prosecutor, but instructed the jury that the arguments
of counsel were not evidence and that the jurors were free to rely on their own memories,
and could accept or disregard what the prosecutor said (R. 124 at 96-97, 108).
Given that the prosecutor's arguments were unsupported by the evidence, the trial
court erred in telling the jurors that they could rely on what the prosecutor said. The trial
court should have reprimanded the prosecutor for his misconduct, and instructed the
jurors to disregard his misstatements. See, e.g., Troy, supra.
Particularly given the court's erroneous instruction that the jurors could rely on the
prosecutor's assertions, the State cannot meet its burden to prove the misstatements
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, there is a reasonable probability of acquittal
on the record of this case. Had the jurors not been misinformed regarding the evidence
and instructed on their supposed entitlement to rely on that misinformation, they may well
have sided with Mr. Callahan, a sixty year old homeless man who was peacefully trying
to open his canned food (R. 124 at 21-22, 66, 51-52, 61), and who was accosted by the
officers, who forcefully took his Leatherman without explaining why first (R. 124 at 5153, 61-62), who threatened him with their batons and pushed him to the ground (R. 124 at
53-54, 63), who cuffed him, dragged him, fell with him to the ground, and pushed him
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and shackled his legs, resulting in his broken glasses and cut nose (R. 124 at 56, 64-65,
67)). See Statement of Facts, supra.
Under Troy, a new trial is in order. See id.
II.
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
THE TRESPASS CONVICTION.
As this case was charged (R. 1-3), and as the jury was instructed (R. 124 at 90), to
sustain the trespass conviction, the State was required to prove that Callahan entered or
remained unlawfully on the property and was reckless regarding whether his presence
would cause fear to the safety of another. Accord, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(a)(iii)(2)
("A person is guilty of criminal trespass if,.. .(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on
property and: (iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of
another[.]").
There is no evidence whatsoever to marshal in support of the element that
Callahan was reckless as to whether his presence would cause fear to the safety of another
on August 26, 2002, when he was sitting peacefully on a bench outside the Liberty Senior
Center, opening his cans of food (R. 124 at 66, 51-52, 61). See Statement of Facts, supra.
While he had been warned on prior occasions that his boisterous conduct on those
occasions would not be tolerated at the center (R. 124 at 21-22), and while he was
informed two days after the incident with the police that he was no longer welcome at the
center (R. 124 at 24-25, 29, 37, 42, 46), there is no evidence that he should have known
10

that his presence on the bench outside the center as he was trying to eat his dinner on
August 26th would cause anyone to fear for their safety.
The trespass charge was premised on the misunderstanding that Callahan had been
told by a Liberty Center employee prior to August 26, 2002, that he could not be at the
center after hours (R. 2). The testimony presented at trial did not support this theory,
because the woman who communicated that message to Callahan did so in writing on
August 28, 2002, and could not testify that she did so verbally at any time prior thereto
(R. 124 at 24-25, 29, 37, 42, 46).
Even if Callahan had been told by a Liberty Center employee that he was not
welcome there after hours, this would not have given him any reason or obligation to
know that his presence would frighten someone for their safety.
Because the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain that charge, this Court
should reverse the trespass conviction. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206(a)(iii)(2), supra.
Trial counsel argued insufficiency of the evidence to the jury (R. 124 at 102-03),
but did not move for a directed verdict or ask the trial court to arrest judgment or
otherwise address the insufficiency of the evidence.
To the degree that trial counsel did not preserve the issue discussed above, this
Court should nonetheless address and correct the error under the exceptional
circumstances, plain error and/or ineffective assistance of counsel doctrines.
Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in cases involving '"rare
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procedural anomalies/" as a "'safety device"5 to avoid manifest injustice. State v.
Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, If 23, 94 P.3d 186.
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness
prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in
hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d
29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989).
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment and
Article I § 12, Callahan must demonstrate that trial counsel's performance fell below
objectively reasonable standards of representation, and that this objectively deficient
performance was prejudicial. See e^g. Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert.
denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994).
One of the most basic duties of a trial lawyer is to properly raise and preserve all
issues in the lower court. See, e^g,, State v. Smedley, 2003 UT App 79 at 110, 67 P3d
1005.
The law in this State clearly places the burden on criminal trial lawyers to raise
claims of insufficient evidence in the trial courts. See State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10
P.3d 346.
Failing to ask the trial court for relief from that charge and conviction was
objectively deficient and prejudicial performance; there was and could have been no valid
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strategic reason for trial counsel to abstain from asking the trial court for the same thing
she appropriately sought from the jury - acquittal on the trespass count, which was not
sustained by the evidence. Compare, e.g.. State v. Moritzky. 771 P.2d 688, 691-93 (Utah
App. 1989) (trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in obtaining a jury instruction on
defense of habitation which lacked helpful presumption provided in amended defense of
habitation statute, resulting the denial of a fair trial and the need for a new trial).
Because there is no evidence to sustain this criminal conviction, and it would be
manifestly unjust to leave the conviction on Mr. Callahan's record, this Court should
correct the error under the exceptional circumstances doctrine discussed above.
See Nelson-Waggoner, supra (Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in
cases involving "'rare procedural anomalies,'" as a "'safety device'" to avoid manifest
injustice).
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Mr. Callahan's convictions and remand this matter to
the trial court for a new trial on the two remaining charges of assault on a police officer.
Respectfully submitted this NovemlAspj^^

\

Attorney for Mr. Callahan
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on November 20, 2005,1 mailed, first class postage pre-paid,
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two true and correct copies of the foregoing to: Deputy District Attorney John D.
Shuman, 185 South State, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

Elizab^
Attorn&J for"
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Callahan

ADDENDUM

TRIAL COURT RESPONSES TO OBJECTIONS
TO PROSECUTOR'S CLOSING ARGUMENT

Page 9

for your participation today.
At the beginning of our trial this morning I
said that we would be discussing some different issues.
I suggested that the defendant, Mr. Callahan was
something of a bully, someone who has tantrums when he
doesn't get his way, somebody who had developed a
pattern of conduct at the Liberty Senior Center over a
course of months and was finally asked to leave, it had
just become intolerable. I believe that the testimony of
Nancy Freeman has shown that. In addition, Officer
Peterson testified that when officers were called
because Mr. Callahan had trespassed on the property, he
became belligerent.
officers.

He pointed a leatherman tool at the

Most of us when we're approached by an

officer, whether for a traffic ticket or something, we
generally are cooperative. That was not the testimony
here.

The testimony was that Mr. Callahan became

belligerent, threatened Officer Wihongi with this
leatherman tool.

And after--

MS. JOHNSON:

Your Honor, I don't believe

that that was actually the testimony.
THE COURT:

Thank you, Counsel

Members of

the Jury, I'll just-- that happens from time to time,
one of the attorneys will feel that the other is
incorrectly stating the facts, and my practice is to

Page 97

1

just remind you that these attorneys are not advocates--

2

I mean they're not witnesses, excuse me. They are

3

advocates, not witnesses.

4

evidence. So if you disagree with anything either of

5

them say, that's fine.

6

of what the witnesses said, not necessarily on what you

7

hear the attorneys say when they summarize it.

8

ahead, Counsel.

9

MR. SHUMAN:

What they say is not

Rely upon your own recollection

Go

So what is uncontroverted is

10

that Officer Peterson's testimony that it took three

11

officers to control and contain the situation, to find

12

out what was going on here. That when they approached

13

Mr. Callahan he did have something in his hand, it turns

14

out to be a leatherman tool, but certainly an officer

15

can't just stand there and let somebody wave anything

16

around in their hand. That wouldn't be common sense. The

17

testimony was that the situation escalated, that Mr.

18

Callahan wouldn't calm down, and he was disrespectful to

19

the officers.

20

was disrespectful to the people at the Liberty Senior

21

Center and he was disrespectful to the officers when

22

they approached him.

23

And isn't that the bottom issue here? He

Now, Judge Reese has just spent quite some

24

time reading to you these jury instructions and I

25

encourage you to pay very close attention to these

Page 108

1
2

last rebuttal if you have any.
MR. SHUMAN:

Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.

3

Well, this defense attorney has just indicated that Mr.

4

Callahan is a confrontational person and what we heard

5

is uncontroverted testimony today about his

6

confrontational nature.

7

threatened people at the old folks home, and he

8

confronted and threatened the officers when they were

9

called to respond there.

10

He confronted and abused and

Let's not split hairs too finely.

Let's

11

decide what message we want to send:

12

when an officer says, "Can I speak to you for a minute,"

13

that it's okay to spit at him, and kick him, and wave

14

your can opener in his face?

15
16
17
18
19

That it's okay

MS. JOHNSON: Objection, Your Honor.

I

believe again that is not what the testimony was.
MR. SHUMAN:

And, again, this is what was

testified to.
THE COURT: Well, Members cf the Jury, you

20

will recall the testimony from the officer about what

21

happened and what he saw and what the other officer told

22

him, so you can accept or disregard what the attorney

23

said he remembers.

24
25

MR. SHUMAN:

And, as jurois, that's your

responsibility to decide who is credible, what are we

CONTROLLING STATUTES

§ 76-5-102. Assault

(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another
or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.

(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy.
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to another.

§ 76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer—Penalty

(1) Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace officer,
and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer, is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

(2) A person who violates this section shall serve, in jail or another correctional facility, a
minimum of:
(a) 90 consecutive days for a second offense; and
(b) 180 consecutive days for each subsequent offense.

(3) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence required under
Subsection (2) if the court finds that the interests of justice would be best served and
makes specific findings concerning the disposition in writing or on the record.

§ 76-1-601. Definitions

Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:

(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech.

(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal action.

(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.

(4) "Conduct" means an act or omission.

(5) "Dangerous weapon" means:
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
(I) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads the victim to reasonably
believe the item is likely to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner that he is in control
of such an item.
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any penal statute of this state.

(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act and the actor is
capable of acting.

(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership,
or unincorporated association.

(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise dominion or control
over tangible property.

(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or
organ, or creates a substantial risk of death.

(11) "Substantial bodily injury" means bodily injury, not amounting to serious bodily
injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, temporary disfigurement, or
temporary loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.

(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, printing, electronic
storage or transmission, or any other method of recording information or fixing
information in a form capable of being preserved.

Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201
For the purposes of this part:

(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer,
sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of
persons or for carrying on business therein and includes:
(a) Each separately secured or occupied portion of the structure or vehicle; and
(b) Each structure appurtenant to or connected with the structure or vehicle.
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at
night, whether or not a person is actually present.

(3) A person "enters or remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when the premises or
any portion thereof at the time of the entry or remaining are not open to the public and
when the actor is not otherwise licensed or privileged to enter or remain on the premises
or such portion thereof.

(4) "Enter" means:
(a) Intrusion of any part of the body; or
(b) Intrusion of any physical object under control of the actor.
§ 76-6-206. Criminal trespass

(1) For purposes of this section, "enter" means intrusion of the entire body.

(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if5 under circumstances not amounting to
burglary as defined in Section 76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76- 6-204 or a violation of Section
76-10-2402 regarding commercial terrorism:
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property and:
(I) intends to cause annoyance or injury to any person or damage to any property,
including the use of graffiti as defined in Section 76-6-107;
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than theft or a felony; or
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence will cause fear for the safety of another;
(b) knowing his entry or presence is unlawful, he enters or remains on property as to
which notice against entering is given by:
(I) personal communication to the actor by the owner or someone with apparent authority
to act for the owner;
(ii) fencing or other enclosure obviously designed to exclude intruders; or
(iii) posting of signs reasonably likely to come to the attention of intruders; or
(c) he enters a condominium unit in violation of Subsection 57-8-7(7).

(3)(a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class C misdemeanor unless it was committed
in a dwelling, in which event it is a class B misdemeanor.
(b) A violation of Subsection (2)(b) is an infraction.
(4) It is a defense to prosecution under this section that the:
(a) property was open to the public when the actor entered or remained; and
(b) actor's conduct did not substantially interfere with the owner's use of the property.

